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PARTICIPATORY PLURALISM AND PERVASIVE
POVERTY: SOME REFLECTIONS
Reginald H. Green*
The small boy who breaks a pot goes to tell his mother 'It got broken'.
Not 'I broke the pot' but 'It got broken' ... And who did this? We
did. We broke the pot.
- Flight-Lieutenant John Jerry Rawlings,
Head of State and Chairman, Provisional
National Defense Council (PNDC), Republic of Ghana
Opportunities should be given to women for greater participation in
the nation's political and decision-making processes at all levels,
especially at the national centers of power.
There should be greater openness in the process of designing the
adjustment package, both within government and beyond. In particular,
employers, trade unions and other relevant groups should be closely
associated with the process both to improve the design of the
programmes and to ensure their fuller understanding and support...
In making the protection of the poor an integral part of adjustment,
the primary strategy should be that of enhancing their productive
capacity through better access to productive resources and assets.
- Khartoum Declaration
I. Pluralism Revisited
Pluralism is a less than satisfactory term of art for use in respect of
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) unless specifically defined for that purpose.
The reason is its near monopolization by a specific formulation related
to the conditions of a particular secular/Christian, industrial, high income,
bourgeois democratic society/polity (the USA).
Participatory pluralism is defined for purposes of this paper as in-
cluding:
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a. participation in preparation and dialogue leading to decisions; as
well as in articulation, implementation, monitoring, review and modifi-
cation;
b. ability and practice of self-organization at levels ranging from basic
community (village, neighborhood, work-place) to national;
c. accountability of leaders and officials both to the people who
directly or indirectly choose them and to those they are intended to serve/
lead.
This definition does not define specific structures. For example a single
party system does not per se mark a polity/civil society as non-plural if
a variety of organizations with participation, ability to act and to speak
on behalf of their members and leadership accountable to those members
exist. If these conditions are met, the affiliation of such organizations to
the single party may be quite consistent with pluralism.
All three elements are required. Genuine participation's absence clearly
prevents pluralism even if there are multiple, autonomous organizations.
But genuine participation can be practiced within monolithic structures
with at least substantial accountability. If these structures either englobe
and control or forbid the existence of other structures and institutions,
then they are clearly not pluralist however participatory, accountable and
majority supported they may be.
Ability to practice self-organization, unless including membership par-
ticipation, selection of and accountability of leaders, is not enough to
demonstrate pluralism. Some organizations - e.g. religious bodies and
heavily state or party directed trade unions - are hierarchical with largely
self-perpetuating leaderships accountable to themselves or to reference
groups other than their members.
Clearly the definition presented is in the form of an "ideal type
construct." No civil society/polity is or ever has been fully participatory
pluralist. The issues in analysis of any actual case are how wide and deep
are participatory pluralist practices and what (both in form and in sub-
stance) and of what kind (e.g. legal, political, informational, real re-
sources, political economic) are the main obstacles to broadening and
deepening?
II. Pluralism in Africa
There is a tendency in Western - and perhaps not only Western -
scholarship to see both past and present African societies/polities as neither
participatory nor pluralist. This appears to result partly from rather
superficial study (especially of the pre-colonial period) and the use of
competitive, multi-party electoral systems as a litmus test.
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Many pre-colonial African polities were participatory to a substantial
extent. In some at least particular interest groups or sub-classes were self-
organized and had spokesmen within the political process. (That others
were excluded - e.g. slaves and often women - demonstrates limits on
pluralism but not its total absence.) Many organizations, e.g. age groups
(often parallel but separate ones for females and for males), religious
bodies, economic groupings existed, had powers and functions of their
own and were to some degree accountable. The hereditary principle was
in practice by no means totally inconsistent with participation and ac-
countability. The selecting in most cases had a range of candidates who
could be picked without being seen to violate the hereditary principle.
Further recall - a fairly draconic form of accountability - was frequently
institutionalized, e.g. "destooling," and for political leadership the hered-
itary principle was far from universal - e.g. it does not appear to have
applied to age groups.
Present African civil societies and polities do have multiple organiza-
tions albeit their number, diversity, freedom or space to act and degree
of outside control vary widely. The area of political parties is the only
one in which this is rarely true. Mainland Sub-Saharan Africa, in practice,
has no competitive, multi-party systems in which a transfer of power by
a victory of the opposition parties is a credible, present possibility.
At national level the main organizations with societal functions are
usually religious, labor (more specifically trade union), women's and, less
uniformly, co-operatives. Peasant organizations with broad bases and
significant functions/influence are quite uncommon. A range of other
bodies, e.g. St. John's Ambulance Society, Boy Scouts, usually exist but
are largely urban and narrowly middle class/Westernized in their mem-
berships. Others, e.g. National Red Cross Societies, are common but vary
from substantially participatory, accountable and self-defining as to pro-
gram (e.g. Mozambique) to de facto statal entities. Locational or home
origin groups appear to be less significant than in the past especially
beyond mobilizing support for (or from) their home districts or localities.
In that sense they are becoming less national and more regional or local.
The range at regional level is probably analogous to national. At local
(basic community) level there is usually a greater degree of complexity
and more organizations. Some are adapted forms of traditional organi-
zations (e.g. age groups and in some cases formally superseded hereditary
political groupings). Others, e.g. peasants, coops, women's groups, are
parallel but lack connection to national organizational structures.
Exclusive ethnic based systems - whether traditional or manipulated
- do not constitute pluralism. If they seek de facto separation from, let
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alone dominance over the state (e.g. Dinka in Sudan, Amhara in Ethiopia)
they constitute as grave a rejection of pluralism as of a national state or
civil society. As historic location and culture specific groups which accept
pluralist civil societies and states, they can make contributions to pluralistic
practice (e.g. Tanzania, perhaps Kenya) especially at home area develop-
ment and local governance levels. But that is not what high profile
"tribalism" and so-called, romanticized "legitimate" parallel power struc-
tures in SSA are about.
III. Persistent Poverty
Sub-Saharan Africa has never had a high level of achieved productive
forces per capita nor a particularly egalitarian income distribution. There-
fore, poverty has been both persistent and widespread.
The degrees, immediate causes and forms of poverty were neither
uniform nor stable before, during nor after colonialism. With very few
exceptions the achieved productive forces per capita declined and the
proportion of the population in absolute poverty rose from 1979 through
1983. In many (probably a majority) of cases, this process of immiseri-
zation and/or disintegration has continued. In others it may have been
halted but not reversed and in a - perhaps increasing - minority it has,
at least tentatively, been reversed and some ground won back.
The basic causes of the decline vary as to nature or date and as to
severity. External economic environment worsening is present in almost
all. Its onset varies from the mid-1970s (base metal and sugar export
dominated economies) through the turn of the decade (beverage buoyed
economies) to the mid-1980s (where petroleum sectors had fuelled growth).
Drought has been another red thread running through most. Gross do-
mestic economic (usually paralleled by political) mismanagement outside
or verging toward a civil war context has been dominant in some cases,
e.g. Ghana (1972-1981) and Zaire (1960 to date) respectively. External
aggression (notably in the Horn, Morocco/Saouri Democratic Republic
and Uganda) have been the dominant cause in several cases (e.g. Angola,
Mozambique, Malawi since 1985, Uganda, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia,
Sudan). Failure to react to other factors with adequate speed, degree and
flexibility is a pervasive characteristic (Zambia, C6te d'Ivoire, Gabon and
Nigeria are possible examples).
More than one factor have usually been present, and it is their
cumulative interaction which has led to the deterioration. For example,
Tanzania had extreme terms of trade shocks over 1978-81; major external
aggression and consequential costs at the same period and again from
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late 1986; drought over 1979-1985; major policy mistakes (premature and
overdone import liberalization and lax fiscal policy) over 1977-79 and an
initial lag in policy response over 1978-79 not fully overcome until 1984
because the process of participatory quasi-pluralist consensus building
took eight years.
IV. Poverty, Production and Distribution
Poverty exists personally and at household level (e.g. entitlement to
an adequate diet); communally (e.g. access to basic health and education
services); regionally (e.g. marginalization from the national economy) and
is rarely infrastructural (e.g. transport and communication) and national
(e.g. low GDP/capita and inability to sustain growth).
Therefore in any assessment of policies institutions or societal patterns,
productive efficiency matters. Without GDP, food production and export
growth higher than that of population few, or no, SSA economies can
attain either stable, strong economic structures and processes or substan-
tial, sustained reductions of the number of persons living in absolute
poverty.
Distribution is also crucial. The dominant impact on distribution comes
from levels and specific structures of production. For example, the strength
of trade unions and the institutional patterns of the labor market dominate
real wage levels and trends given output levels while the pattern, support
for and trends in agriculture among small, middle and large peasants (in
the Maoist sense), capitalist-form enterprises (corporate or otherwise) and
state or cooperative sub-sectors is likely to dominate rural income distri-
bution (as well as levels, trends and make-up of agricultural output).
However, the production impact on distribution may be indirect. The
clearest example is the Botswana diamond sector. Seventy-five percent of
gross surplus (itself about 75% of gross output) goes to the state and a
substantial portion is used to broaden wage employment, provide near
universal access to basic services and provide part-time employment and
personal consumption supplements to members of 'poverty focus groups'.
Communal, infrastructural and regional poverty (as defined above) require
a catalytic initial and usually a dominant subsequent central government
role if they are to be addressed and redressed on a rapid and sustained
basis. The implications of this for fiscal policy (on both revenue and
expenditure side) including levels and allocation should be evident.
V. Development Without Growth?
Nominally absolute poverty reduction - especially personal and com-
munal and, perhaps, regional - could be pursued within a constant per
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capita GDP. Even that means a 3% absolute trend growth rate, well
above SSA's average since 1980. However, the social and political con-
straints on such a redistributive process out of fixed resources are usually
(perhaps always except in the context of total revolution or the immediate
aftermath of decolonization or civil war) such as to prevent its being far-
reaching or lasting. Radically altered allocations of additional resources
(relative to the existing pattern) are less difficult to attain and, especially,
to sustain. For lower, and lower middle income economies the room for
manoeuvre from redistributing what exists is very narrow to negative
especially where (as in Tanzania) substantial anti-poverty and egalitarian
redistribution has previously been carried out under more buoyant eco-
nomic circumstances.
It is certainly true that growth without development is possible; the
inverse, development without growth, is very unlikely to be attainable
except briefly, to a limited extent and in special circumstances.
VI. Poverty and Pluralism
Poverty usually creates barriers to pluralism's vitality and breadth.
For example, poor, uneducated rural women usually have quite good
perceptions of their own needs and goals and of what would be required
to satisfy and make progress toward them. Crushing time burdens, gaps
in knowledge and skills, negligible resource availability above survival
requirements and limited information on how to acquire what is missing
(or how to organize groups to perform certain functions) often prevent
their effective organization or participation.
A second strand is a narrowing of who is able to participate fully and
who can afford to be a leader. Both require knowledge and time. Those
with a resource margin above absolute poverty are more likely to have
both. As a result they can be more effective leaders and their choice by
poor members need not be either manipulated or subservient. Equally
they may desire and try to be accountable. Nonetheless, the breadth of
pluralism is narrowed and accountability rendered voluntary and optional
which is inherently dangerous.
At a somewhat different level economic decline increases tension.
States and major organizations find themselves less able to serve their
members, less able to buy support (or buy off opposition) and less credible.
At the same time they face rising levels of complaints (at least as long as
their good intentions and ability to act on them retain some credibility),
of demands requiring resources to meet and of challenges to their authority
and/or legitimacy. The response may include seeking greater mobilization
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and participation (to offset losses in other resources) and greater account-
ability (to demonstrate that the palpable non-successes do not relate to
lack of good faith or competence). They are almost certain to include
limitations on expression - and more particularly on organization - of
dissent and caution in respect of autonomous organizations especially if
they seek to express dissent. Repression - at least episodically - is likely.
Certainly these strands of constraint on an always limited, licensed and
scrutinized pluralism in Kenya have grown more severe as poverty has
worsened.
There are countervailing factors. Survival is a great mother of inven-
tion. There are probably more autonomous rural organizations of poor
people at local level now than in 1980 in most SSA countries. The erosion
of state capacity does create operational space. Some existing organizations
have been strengthened. This can be ambiguous, e.g., the long established
Accra market women's organizational structures have become tighter in
terms of self-protection against economic adversity and a state which is
at best skeptical of their role. But these are oligopsonistic structures which
are increasingly (and on occasion violently) exclusionist so the net impact
on poor consumers, producers and would-be marketers is negative.
Other positive developments include broadening of roles, e.g. of
churches into direct social action and organization, and transformation
of traditional structures. For example in Accra, while extended family
systems weakened with too many members needing solidarity and too few
having resources to provide it, new neighborhood, food seller/processor-
linked and savings/credit social groups emerged to fill some of the
resultant gaps. These trends are evidence of the viability and serviceability
of pluralism in contexts of increasing economic and social stress. But they
should neither be romanticized nor exaggerated. On balance the trend has
been negative. Survival is a necessary priority; by itself it is not an
adequate one.
VII. Pluralism and the Road Ahead
Looking at pluralism and rehabilitation, recovery and economic trans-
formation a relatively strong case can be made for its functionality in a
"right to development"/"human condition" strategy, albeit (somewhat
ironically) not in a neo-liberal ("free markets make free men") one. As
the British experience since 1979 strongly suggests, neo-liberalism is in-
herently corrosive of pluralism, participation and accountability.
If production by poor people matters, the actual reach of the state is
limited even in fields in which it should be present and decentralization
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is likely to be productively and distributionally efficient, then participation,
accountability and parallel (hopefully complementary) institutional actors
are important. That is a substantially more than marginal case for plu-
ralism.
VIII. Emerging Foci and Divergences
The basic convergence is between basic human needs (the right to
development) as an overriding target with universal access to basic services
supporting more production by/fairer payment to the poor as the main
ways to achieve them and the human investment for productivity approach
(originally neo-classical and associated with a fraction of neo-liberalism).
This approach has been designed to refute the claims that while poverty
and misery (up to and including premature death) may be deplorable,
"There Is No Alternative." In the process it has created a politically
saleable message (vide the response to Band Aid) and, potentially, a way
to convert immediate emotional human concern into longer term backing
for rehabilitation, recovery and redevelopment after survival.
There is neither complete synthesis of the approaches nor tactical
coherence. Production by the poor has encountered much more resistance
(intellectually and by, e.g., the World Bank) than universal access to basic
services - apparently because the latter can be formulated more generally,
elegantly and econometrically and is consistent with strands of traditional
neo-classical economics. "Human investment" - as a result of its origins
and of the fact that middle and higher level personpower who (at least
once trained/educated) are not/will not be poor - is not always clearly
related to the short run human condition of poor majorities.
The initial tactical concentration was on the situation of people made
poorer or more vulnerable by stabilization and adjustment programs. This
did have the advantage of putting the Bank - and to a lesser extent the
Fund and some bilateral agencies - on the defensive. Rising malnutrition
and, a fortiori, infant mortality linked to one's own programmatic advice
is difficult to defend. At that level, at least verbally (and to a lesser
degree programmatically), the battle is being won. Virtually all relevant
bodies say that the human condition effects of stabilization and structural
adjustment measures must be seen as important and if otherwise sound
policies cause deterioration, measures to offset them must be undertaken.
The Bank did collaborate in raising $70-80 million for the initial phase
of Ghana's PAMSCAD marketed as such a program.
Three limitations confront any approach focused primarily on the
"victims of stabilization and adjustment" (or even the poor among them
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- bankrupted formerly rich parallel marketeers, more pungently describ-
able as "two-legged wingless vultures," presumably worry few other than
themselves and their close associates but ex-middle income clerks and
managers are prominent beneficiaries of some adjustment amelioration
programs including PAMSCAD). First, it is hard to link most human
condition deterioration to stabilization/adjustment programs separated
from the crises which led to these programs. The counterfactual progres-
sion in the absence of the types and levels of fees and to general budgetary
deterioration impact on social services more generally. Second, no program
designed solely to offset costs of adjustment can be expected to address
the basic requirements of all poor and/or vulnerable people. Third, if the
human condition is the key test, then how it changes for all people
(especially all poor and vulnerable people) - whatever the reasons for
their initial poor condition - is the central justification or damnation of
any applied economic strategy. Means to passing that test are necessarily
integral to strategic design, not add-ons.
IX. The Human Dimension and Human Rights
Any approach to development (or any other branch of applied political
economy) inevitably has a positive or negative human rights component.
Any approach centering on the human dimension has an inherent com-
mitment to human rights. Whether to all human rights, with what priorities
and to what extent is a more complex (and ultimately contextual) question.
The standard divisions between individual and communal, socio-eco-
nomic and civil, hortatory and enforceable, resource expensive and no
resource cost and unifying or divisive human rights are distinctly unhelpful.
These supposed distinctions are objectively misleading and serve the sub-
jective purpose of selective opposition to human rights and to regimes
opposed on different grounds, not of supporting human rights holistically
defined. Virtually all human rights are both individual and communal,
for the moderately self-evident reason that human beings live in societies
and interact with each other. Freedom of speech is usually categorized as
individual. Yet it has meaning only in a community context (of auditors
and interactors). Food security is usually classified as communal, but
eating enough to avoid hunger or starvation is also a very individual need.
Similarly, socio-economic and civil rights inter-penetrate. Poverty and
lack of education have a negative impact on ability to exercise civil
liberties. Prevention of freedom of speech, of organization and of political
participation frequently cripple socio-economic program design, mobilizing
power, implementation and error-correction feedback. The categories are
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not meaningless but the assumption of inherent contradiction, rather than
of basic (even if not total) complimentarity, is wrong.
Whether rights are hortatory or enforceable is a contextual question
with political economic (resource availability and allocation) and socio-
political (political and legal norms and institutions/processes) aspects.
Freedom from hunger/food security is in principle enforceable and in
practice hortatory. The resource problem is one of priority in allocation
plus practicable delivery (Subsidy or gift? Access to earned income?
Capacity to grow more?) problematics. The socio-political may either be
of norms (how repugnant is the hunger of others? How strong the
commitment to a right to eat for each and all?) or of institutions and
laws (i.e. of effective accountability). The same is true of effective freedom
of speech, i.e. the resources and mechanisms for most individuals actually
speaking so that their desired audiences can hear and respond to them
either do not exist or are otherwise allocated.
Norms against, and structures to prevent, communications oligopoli-
zation or monopolization are weak in all countries even if the nature of
quasi-accepted oligopolists varies.
The resource cost distinction is a variation on the preceding one.
Again it does not hold up. Freedom from torture is regularly cited as no
cost. But properly equipped, trained and remunerated police, judicial and
prison systems are expensive. So is unresolved and unsanctioned crime.
Torture (no matter how morally unacceptable nor, for that matter, how
ultimately dysfunctional) can be seen as a low resource cost shortcut to
which poor victims of crime often have no objection if they perceive it
as directed against clever criminals who terrorize witnesses and buy up
lawyers and the legal processes. In reverse, if freedom from hunger in a
given context requires low cost means to enable poor farmers to produce,
eat and sell more food and urban workers to earn more and buy more
food, the macroeconomic results can be very resource positive (i.e. more
resources generated than used) even in the quite short run.
In principle all human rights are ultimately complementary. In practice
all are both unifying and dividing. Most entail losses for at least some
present holders of power, prestige and/or wealth. Others lead to a tensions
of right versus right, e.g. small indigenous minorities' land and culture
rights can conflict with the need of poor indigenous majorities to earn a
livelihood. Ecological protection of the "wildlife heritage of mankind"
which leads to opposing tsetse fly control even when the latter is vital to
preserving the livelihood of poor cattle raisers and to preventing the re-
emergence of human sleeping sickness also raises conflict of rights issues.
More generally, moving toward fuller empowerment to exercise rights
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costs real resources. Because these are scarce, genuine issues of prioriti-
zation, timing and initial beneficiaries arise. If inability to import - say,
drugs and paper - cripples basic health and eduction services while
average calorie availability is satisfactory, promoting production for export
is not irrelevant to enhancing effective human rights.
The human dimension approach has not systematically addressed
human rights questions under that rubric, but it has made specific prop-
ositions which demonstrably go beyond the caricaturization of "bread
and circuses" sometimes applied by critics of poverty reduction oriented
strategies. These include: the identification of actual groups of actual
poor people on regional, occupational and gender bases as well as in
terms of specific unmet needs (varying from group to group and place to
place) and has been characterized by repeated insistence on participation
linked to self-organization and expression by poor people.
The quotations from the Khartoum Declaration show certain problems.
Increased participation is sometimes viewed as "given" (a noblesse oblige,
not a rights approach), and participation and organization are argued on
productivity (avoiding errors, increasing mobilization) rather than nor-
mative grounds. Accountability is backed without using the word. But
the contrast to the "modernization" conceptualization and declamation
is marked, and that with the "neo liberal" still greater. Participation,
women, identifiable poor people communally and individually are to the
center of the agenda and perceived as having the right to speak for
themselves and to be listened to.
The human dimension approach has evolved quite independently of
formal human rights dialogue. Even the relevant African Charter and still
less the UN Declarations or Conventions are virtually never cited; the
ILO Conventions are, but rarely. This is not a desirable situation but it
is factual. Economic-political-social condition and process-oriented con-
tributors to the human dimension approach should pay more attention to
the human rights stream.
Human rights workers need to build concrete interaction with real
people in real contexts and the means whereby they could be empowered
to broaden and deepen their rights and especially the components of the
right to development. Among African states there is a correlation between
the operability of key elements of the human dimension approach and
respect for human rights so entitled, but the concerns seem to be parallel
and the interactions implicit and subliminal rather than articulated and
expressed.
This is not because human rights is a Western concept in substance,
as opposed to particular verbal and contextual formulations. That argu-
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ment does not really respect cultural pluralism. It is either racist or a
defence of valuable wrongs flowing from the denial of human rights.
African societies and traditions do have clear commitments to the duties
of rulers and the rights (including participation and self-organization) of
subjects. What are perhaps Western are: a) separation of rights and duties
(which is inherently incompatible with any social compact formulation)
and, b) the isolation of the individual from human (social) contexts leading
to a binary individual/state nexus (curiously inconsistent with actual
human contexts, and not least with pluralism). The African Charter
encompasses both rights and duties and also the rights of peoples as well
as of persons.
X. An African Overview
The human condition - the social fabric of people's lives, the state
of their cooking pots - is the ultimate test of development. It is also
among the vital means to achieving it. To waste much of Africa's basic
economic factor of production - the work of its women and men - by
allowing them to remain locked in vulnerability, enforced overwork or
enforced idleness and poverty is both a human and social failure and
gross economic inefficiency. The reality of what is happening today is
starkly summed up in a 1985 UNICEF poster of a young African girl.
"What do you want to be when you grow up?" "Alive." For millions
of infants and young children over the past decade it is a plea which has
gone unanswered. They are prematurely dead. Unless the right to live can
be made real no other human rights are possible. For the dead there is
neither a future nor future access to other rights. The average human
condition of Africans - women and men, the young and the aged,
peasants and urban slum dwellers, the ill and the crippled, displaced
victims of drought and of war - is appalling. Worse, it is not improving
- as it was in most countries however slowly, prior to 1980. The rips in
the social fabrics are lengthening, the cracks in the pots are widening.
These facts are statistically known from a wide range of indicators:
infant mortality and life expectancy, malnutrition and food supplies, access
to pure water and to sanitation, illiteracy and access to education, income
per household and environmental degradation. The stark reality is that
the fabrics of many African societies - national, regional and local -
have been rent. The cooking pots of millions have been broken. To
pretend otherwise is to deceive ourselves and to betray the poor and
vulnerable people: the women, the children, the displaced victims of
drought and war, the poor peasants and the equally poor urban slum
dwellers.
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XI. People as Actors - and Scriptwriters
No nation can be great and prosperous the majority of whose people
are poor and miserable. Those words of Adam Smith set out a central
truih. Many of his disciples preaching sermons in Africa and at Africans
would do well to use it as a test of their own proposals.
The human condition of individual people, of families, of communities
and of societies is, as Mwalimu Julius Nyerere has put it, the only ultimate
objective, justification and validation of development. Human beings are
ends not objects, actors not things to be manipulated. Of course increased
command over material resources - gross domestic product to use mac-
roeconomic terminology - matters for a nation as well as a household.
Food and health, education and water, sanitation and environmental
protection all require real resources. Of course balancing income and
expenditure - closing external and fiscal imbalances - matter nationally
as well as individually. Crushing debt and demeaning begging damage the
human condition of persons, of peoples and of states. Of course, choices
and sacrifices need to be made by states and societies as well as by
families and individuals. The need to provide for tomorrow and the duty
to the rising and future generations are central to African thought and
society. But these things matter because of what they mean for human
beings - and especially for poor and vulnerable human beings.
People are also in a basic sense means. Means to achieving improve-
ments in their human condition through economic recovery and devel-
opment. Labor and land are two of the three basic factors of economic
production. From work applied to natural resources the third, capital,
can be won and embodied in productive assets: tree crops and transport
systems, improved fields and power plants or dams, hospitals or health
posts and factories, houses and shops, schools and mines. But the poverty,
the malnutrition, the inadequate access to education of a majority of the
people of Africa increasingly weaken their ability to work long, hard and
productively. Their poverty increasingly forces them to abuse and destroy
the land so the bone white of ruined, dead and dying land creeps wider
across earth satellite pictures like the destroying cancer it is. By rending
the fabric of society, growing immiseration is equally surely breaking the
cycles of production, of reproduction and of surplus generation and
creating contexts in which all human rights, however defined, are always
in danger of erosion or extinction.
To regard nutrition, health services and education as the fruits of
development to be deferred until after high production has been attained
is self-defeating. Only the well nourished, healthy and literate can consis-
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tently and increasingly be efficient productive workers. To see access to
pure water, reduction of women's workload and child survival as goals
for after economic recovery is to ensure that there will be, at best, delayed
and stunted recovery. Women worn out carrying water for miles, tending
sick children and bearing replacements for those prematurely dead 'are
not merely denied their rights as human beings but drained of the time
and energy to produce more.
Similarly, to restore and to expand output requires the fuller partici-
pation in production of the poor - not their exclusion from it. To
provide tractors and large irrigated farms for the few and to ignore
machetes and jembes (cutlasses and hoes) and improved seeds for the
many is economic madness. It cannot solve malnutrition (the poor will
have no means to buy food) nor, usually, restore a viable trend rate of
growth of agricultural output. To make this case against large public
sector agricultural units and ignore its applicability to private is to become
trapped in ideological tunnel vision.
Production matters. It requires exports as well as textbooks, lorries
as well as basic drugs, efficient factories as well as jembes and machetes,
taxes as well as protected wells. For some crops, in some places, under
some conditions, large units and mechanization do make social and
economic sense. The point is not to argue for basic services instead of
production or production by the poor instead of by the not so poor. It
is to stress that most present plans do the reverse. They fail to recognize
the vital role of basic services and of production by the poor without
which recovery will be limited and development (even in narrowly eco-
nomic terms) virtually unattainable.
XII. Stabilization, Adjustment: And/or Instead of Restoring the
Human Condition?
Economic malaise, crises and decline have weighed most heavily on
poor and vulnerable people. When government resources are reduced,
provision of basic services and maintenance of infrastructure are cut back,
usually from the periphery. Feeder roads go first, capital city highways
last. When health services face resource crisis rural health posts and clinics
are usually hit first and central reference hospitals last. It is to the credit
of some African states, medical services and communities (and their
external cooperating partners) that there are exceptions to that pattern,
but in general the greater the distance - geographic, gender, indigenous
ethnic, social, economic or political - from the centers of power, the
greater the cutbacks.
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When production falters vulnerable people lose their employment, see
the product of their self-employment fall, have their entitlement to food
torn away. They have neither the resources to ride out a crisis nor the
flexibility to adjust to new ways of earning a decent livelihood. Most
have indeed adapted enough to survive; without that they would have
died. But millions could not adapt; they have died. For the poor and
vulnerable people of Africa death is very close, margins above survival
very narrow. As the proverb puts it: give a rich man less food and he
will grow thin; give a poor man less food and he will die.
Crises of falling export earnings and import capacity, eroding govern-
ment revenues and inflationary deficits, inefficient policies and under-
utilized capacity are very real. But they are not more real nor more
important than crises of rising numbers living in absolute poverty with
rising infant mortality; of the re-emergence of killer diseases like yaws
and yellow fever; of school systems near collapse and peasants without
tools or seeds. They are part of the same human crisis. The first crises
exacerbate the latter; reducing the latter is necessary to addressing the
first.
Therefore, one basic test of all economic recovery and development
programs is whether they will improve the human condition - make poor
people less poor and vulnerable people less vulnerable by making it possible
for them to produce more and by increasing their access to basic services
as well as their control over program and policy formulation and ability
to hold decision takers and professionals accountable. If a program cannot
pass those tests in prospect, and also in operation, it is fatally flawed
and itself in need of structural adjustment or total redesign. This test is
stronger than whether the stabilization and adjustment programs are the
basic cause of poverty (they are not) or of whether they address the
problems of poor and vulnerable people directly injured by some of their
components (important but inadequate). Human condition recovery must
go step by step with production recovery or neither is likely to be either
efficient or sustainable.
Because the plight of the poor and vulnerable is the most desperate
and urgent it is useful to indicate more specifically who these people are.
Most fall into seven groups:
a. victims of prolonged drought and/or ecological degradation whose
previous sources of income have been wiped out;
b. poor, often female-headed households pushed by land shortages
onto marginal or sub-marginal land - pioneers and victims of the "rural
sponge" effect which has limited the rise of open unemployment/land-
lessness;
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c. households in isolated or peripheral areas physically and institu-
tionally at the end of the line for all goods and services;
d. small producers - usually primarily engaged in self-provisioning
but also selling food even when they have a nutritional deficit, because
it is their basic cash income source - unable to increase or even sustain
output with declining access to inputs;
e. victims of war who are dislocated with loss of access to health,
education and water as well as of land, herds, homes, tools, seeds and
food stocks and plunged into a context of physical insecurity and psy-
chological trauma while government resources and physical capabilities
are debilitated by war bills and destruction;
f. "informal" urban sector members whose numbers have risen while
incomes of the formal sector they served and supplemented fell and whose
slum or exurb areas have become more crowded and less provided with
basic services;
g. urban wage earners whose real wages have plunged so sharply they
and other household members have had to add "informal" economic
activities to limit the fall in their living standards in order to survive.
XIII. The Slippery Slope Revisited
How the economies of most African states and the human condition
of most African people came to be so debilitated matters; not primarily
to win debates or apportion blame but to understand how to win clear
and "to look our mistakes squarely in the face lest we fall into repeating
them" as Rector Rui Balthasar Santos of Eduardo Mondlane University
put it.
The radical, general worsening of the situation dates to 1980. After
very low growth over 1970-75, most African states made fairly rapid
economic progress over 1976-79 and human condition indicators advanced
- even if limited and unequally distributed. Since then all but a handful
of Africa's economies have been on a declining path in terms of per
capita output while poverty and vulnerability have been growing. Why?
One major answer - probably the dominant one on output per capita
declines - is the 1979-88 evolution of the international economic envi-
ronment confronting Africa. The 1979-82 recession and slow 1983-88
recovery in the industrial economies have had a disastrous impact on
Africa's exports valued in terms of import capacity. Over 1976-81 a World
Bank study showed several African economies - e.g. the C6te d'Ivoire
and Tanzania - as among the worst affected. Many primary products'
real values (import purchasing power per unit exported) are at fifty year
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lows and the recent slight recovery in metals and virtually all projections
give little promise of significant change. Industrial economy protectionism
and dumping have hampered export diversification. The financial flow
position has also worsened. Real net concessional finance per capita (grants
and new soft loans less interest and repayment on old) declined sharply
from the mid-1970s to early 1980s and have been stagnant since. Non-
concessional flows have gone negative. Africa has a debt burden relative
to exports greater than that of any other region. Payment on present
terms is not possible and the attempt to sustain it is dramatically limiting
imports, choking off recovery and worsening the human condition. That
is not just the view of African governments, the ADB, the ECA and the
OAU, but also 6t analyses by the World Bank, the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer and a banker majority
UN export group.
Drought - on a virtually continental basis - exacerbated the already
unsatisfactory food production trend. After good years in 1985-86, 1987-
88 again saw several droughts. Until food production levels in normal
years - especially by poor peasants - are much higher, vulnerability of
output to drought is reduced and holding of reserves (especially at peasant
household level) augmented, this scourge will regularly derail or reverse
recovery efforts.
For many African economies the macroeconomic and human costs of
war are greater than those of any other exogenous shock. Nowhere is this
as brutally clear as in Southern Africa. Mozambique and Angola produc-
tion (excluding oil) is about half what it would be had South Africa not
waged war against them - directly and by proxy. As detailed in UNICEF's
Children on the Front Line, by the end of 1988 over 1,000,000 human
beings were already dead as direct or indirect results of the war, up to
12 million driven from their homes, up to 8 million in danger of starvation.
Other wars equally destructive of the human condition, including life
itself, are less exogenous. The wars of the Horn of Africa, of the Sudan
and of Uganda have roots which are indigenous centuries old. Even in
these cases external action and inaction have raised the potential for
destruction and made resolution of conflicts harder. The external actions
include those of other African states as well as of great powers - e.g.
Libya in Uganda, the mutual destabilization of the Horn states and a
fortiori Morocco's colonial conquest of the Sahara Democratic Republic.
Not all causes are exogenous. African governments have made policy
mistakes and have been too slow in responding to the worsening external
context. In all candor, however, it should be noted that many of these
decisions were taken on external advice and are now attacked by those
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who once pushed them. With the adoption of APPER and of national
rehabilitation, recovery and renewed development programs by a majority
of African states, there has been substantial improvement on the economic
policy front. That again is not solely the judgement of the OAU or the
ECA; the World Bank and the United Nations General Assembly have
said the same.
To date these economic policies rarely give adequate attention to the
human dimension nor enough priority to improving it. That is no new
weakness; it typified most development plans and programs of the 1960s
and 1970s. Then, however, with less constrained resources and a less
hostile international economic environment, the old export-led, dependent,
central city and high-income-group-focused model was consistent with
some improvement in human condition indicators in general and in basic
services extension in particular. Today and tomorrow no such compatibility
is likely to be within the grasp of most African states. Either the nature
and priorities of development will be re-thought and acted upon on new
premises or what economic growth there is will march hand-in-hand with
rising levels of inequality and poverty, misery and instability.
One concrete example is health. Life expectancy is much lower and
mortality much higher in Africa than in the industrial North. The largest
single difference is in infant and under-five mortality. These are 30% of
all deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa but only two or three percent in most
industrial economies. The main causes are neo-natal tetanus, five epidemic
diseases (including measles, tuberculosis and polio), malaria, impure water
related morbidity (including diarrhoea), and malnutrition linked diseases
and/or loss of resistance to disease. For older children and adults mal-
nutrition and impure water related diseases, malaria, a handful of epidemic
diseases and accidents treatable by first aid are the dominant killers.
Urban hospital care is largely irrelevant to reducing these death tolls
in Africa - as it was in Europe. Yet it engrosses 60 to 70% of the typical
African health budget. Primary health care (including first aid), basic
drug lists and supplies, extended immunization programs, oral rehydration
and simple health education (including sanitation) are of proven low cost
effectiveness. But they receive 10 to 15% of the majority of African
health budgets. The warning of Cheik Amidou Kane is even more timely
now than when he first made it in 1985: "Frustrations and failure will
mount if we do not immediately summon the courage to revise the ways
we think and take action."
XIV. What Is To Be Done? Roads Back and Forward
To make the human condition integral and central to Africa's eco-
nomic recovery and development requires a comprehensive political and
socio economic strategy encompassing at least eight elements:
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1. recognition that people matter as subjects and ends of and main
means and actors to attaining stabilization, recovery and renewed devel-
opment;
2. understanding that throwing away much of Africa's most basic
factor of production - the labor of its people - by excluding the poor
and vulnerable, is economically wasteful and inefficient;
3. acting on the reality that marginal rates of economic as well as
social return from enabling poor people to produce more are often high.
A real problem is making small, contextual, poor people centered projects
visible to central decision takers and credible to bureaucrats and analysts
- and making regulations compatible with implementing them;
4. comprehension that health, education and pure water are both
human and social goods and important to maintaining present and raising
future economic productivity, to making possible fuller participation in
production by women who are the chief victims of illiteracy and on whose
backs falls the burden of fetching water and caring for the sick;
5. focusing on employment and production not subsidies and relief,
e.g. through employment programs to relieve drought losses and rehabil-
itate the economic base of poor households;
6. articulation of short term priorities to lay foundations for long
run sustained development, e.g. in applied, field tested, peasant user
friendly, producer cost effective agricultural research begun now to make
it possible to sustain 5% agricultural growth in the late 1990s;
7. political as well as economic awareness that participation in pro-
duction by poor people is crucial to underpinning their survival and the
improvement of their human condition. Without it their social and political
participation will remain limited and perpetually at risk;
8. comprehension of the extreme economic inefficiency of rending
the fabric of society - strikes and riots, go-slows and loss of morale,
steadily growing grinding poverty and recurrent economic disasters without
human rehabilitation are devastating even in narrow economic terms.
The poor and the vulnerable are not amorphous masses, but groups
of human beings. To fail to see what their needs are as perceived by
themselves is to exclude them. To suppose their needs and capabilities are
uniform is to render many people invisible. These errors and blindnesses
are particularly frequent and serious with respect to women. Most African
women are excluded or invisible but also over-burdened and under-assisted.
Basic barriers to economic as well as human development posed by the
excessive workload most African women bear are rarely recognized clearly.
The implications of the gender division of labor in agriculture are rarely
taken account of by agricultural research and extension. These elements
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are central to serious efforts to improve the human condition. Three
elements are crucial:
a. universal access - to literacy, to basic education, to primary health
care, to pure water, to agricultural inputs, to fuel - is disproportionately
beneficial to women because when access is limited they are dispropor-
tionately deprived of them;
b. serious attention to reducing women's workload - e.g. by closer
water and health facilities, by programs (e.g. immunization) reducing child
illness, by improving technologies relevant to female tasks (e.g. food
processing, moving water and fuel wood as well as food production);
c. central roles for women in planning/decision-taking about projects
and programs which primarily affect them, e.g. rural water supply and
maintenance, sanitation, food crop research and extension.
The conceptualization above is not - especially in this full-blooded
and consistently articulated form - dominant in Africa today. But neither
is it absent or simply the importation of an external intellectual fad. In
fragmentary forms, diverse formulations and different degrees of com-
prehensiveness and forcefulness it is both 'widespread and gaining ground
from farmsteads to capitals, from the excluded to the intellectuals, from
the marginalized to the powerful and in commitment and praxis as well
as principle and prose. The Khartoum Declaration of March 1988 on the
Human Dimension does embody priorities and perceptions which were
not equally prominent even three years ago. However wide the gap between
affirmation and action the movement is on both fronts not 'just affir-
mation.
XV. Accountability - Reconstruction - Pluralism
Accountability is used here in the sense of being able to select, sanction
and remove leaders or major institutional actors. For accountability to be
reliable and efficient requires both adequate data from the leaders on
their actions in a form allowing independent evaluation/judgement and
also a capacity for such evaluation/judgement by the recipients.
The case for accountability is not that all choices/decisions will be
normatively just or even functionally desirable for those holding the leaders
to account. Democracy neither needs to be nor can be defended on the
basis that under it all decisions are just an/or functional in respect to the
goals which led to their being taken. The case is that without accounta-
bility, democracy is at best involuntarily given by leaders - as is partic-
ipation - and decisions are likely to be even less efficient from human
condition/human rights perspectives. The relevance of pluralism is that
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independent/autonomous organizations provide channels through which
to route, and bases from which to press for, accountability.
XVI. Some Practical issues in Accountability
Accountability is fragmented, uneven, incomplete and feeble in SSA.
Formal structural examination does not help understand many cases
because the actual processes and accountabilities vary widely, e.g. the
single Party states in Tanzania and Kenya afford very different degrees
of power to enforce accountability to peasants absolutely and relative to
other groups. Similarly ombudspersons, where effective at all, usually
tend to provide access not primarily to the poor who would otherwise
have none but improved access for diligent middle class members.
Severe processual problems arise among levels. For example, a society
in which a political structure is relatively open and accountable from the
base up and is explicitly superior to the governmental structures officially,
should, on the face of it, guarantee accountability. But if each Party level
can call each government level to account, incoherence and wide diver-
gences in praxis are likely while otherwise the base-up-then-across and
top-down way of holding accountable is cumbersome and slow.
Contextual differences with direct local accountability are hard to
reconcile with national coherence and it is not safe to assume either that
the latter is trivial or that the closer to the base political or governmental
institutions/personnel are, the greater their concern with the human con-
dition or feeling of responsibility to poor people. Acceptance of account-
ability and perception of responsibility does not lead automatically to
meaningful acceptance of base level participation in operational policy
articulation, formulation and decision taking, and still less to a guarantee
that policies will in fact serve their intended beneficiaries well, cost
efficiently or even at all.
External agencies have genuine problems in respect to client account-
ability. They already have accountability structures to governing councils
and/or parent ministries. These are usually along standard inter-govern-
mental organizational or national institutional lines. They do not (even
when the council does include South governments) result in real account-
ability to any particular client on any specific issue even at national level.
At best there is an openness to listen to client critiques and to try (on at
best a voluntary normative responsibility basis) to respond to them. More
rarely there is also involvement of clients in program design and results
monitoring.
It is easier to criticize this pattern than to suggest alternatives. Multiple
lines of accountability will lead to conflicts and conflicting demands. How
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these can be minimized, guidelines for weighing different obligations
devised and a workable conflict resolution procedure created is by no
means self-evident, especially across an array of widely divergent host
settings. Yet for some agencies in some host contexts to make the attempt
is essential if operational progress is to be made.
XVII. Promotion, Empowering, Enjoining, Sanctioning
Achieving progress toward greater and broader effective access to
human rights and a fuller and less precarious human dimension to
rehabilitation and development require complex processes. The failure to
realize and to articulate that realization is partly the result of the paral-
lelism rather than interaction of the human dimension and human rights
approaches. Advocates of the former stress rational explication and nor-
mative campaigning to promote change and resource allocations to em-
power it. They are less prone to considering structures to forestall, and
procedures to enjoin, deviations from stated goals and still less prone to
consider how offenders (or at the least offenses) could be sanctioned and
grievances redressed. Human rights lawyers tend to stress sanctioning and
enjoining (by court cases or public pressure) plus a different style of
normative promotion with little attention to institutional means to prevent
or limit harm and even less to resource provision to empower states, and
societies as well as persons, smaller communities and enterprises, to
achieve, to provide and to exercise human rights. Logically the two
approaches are complementary but with little interaction to date. This is
not obvious and they are often misconstrued as alternative or antagonistic.
Promotion (or consciousness and coalition building) is a first step
toward realizing change. People - including groups with substantial
cumulative actual or potential power - need to be convinced that: the
change is desirable; as well as pracicable; and will serve their needs and!
or interests. Without that base the only way to achieve change is top
down imposition (or small scale quasi-anarchic parallel system construc-
tion).
Empowerment involves: first, identifying what specific resources (by
no means only financial or material resources) are needed to achieve what
goals, by (and for) whom over what time span and, second, devising ways
to mobilize additional or reallocate existing resources to those ends. This
is no trivial matter - Damascus Road conversions are not always necessary
(some governments and leaders, as well as many poor people, do believe
in human rights and give priority to the human dimension) and are rarely
sufficient. It does no good to seek to sanction a very poor country for
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not instantly providing universal literacy, universal access to primary health
care and universal adequate dietary entitlements. Persons and small com-
munities (or enterprises) need political space to organize and to act, access
to knowledge, trained personnel and genuinely supportive expert assistance
in specialized areas, as well as material and financial resources. Societies
and states need the same. The political space may be international (it is
dangerous to be a radical democratic state socialist near the USA) or
national (entrenched indigenous elite minorities and less inherently elitist
bodies such as some trade and student unions can destabilize radical
reformist governments - vide the road to the assassination of Thomas
Sankara).
Promotion and empowerment are not enough. Genuine mistakes and
hostile intentions (including vested interests in lethargy and an easy life
as well as in enjoyment of exploitative profit or non-accountable power)
exist. It is crucial to avert, prevent and enjoin actions or inactions which
hamper, halt or reverse progress toward fuller attainment of human rights.
Prevention, not redress after damage, and structures leading to ap-
propriate initial actions not procedures for enjoining wrong ones are the
basic institutional and processual goals. Institutional structures which build
in participation and accountability (as well as ones which ignore or prevent
them) can be devised and operated. Resource allocation criteria in favor
of the human dimension approach can be articulated and prospective
policies, ongoing processes and retrospective evaluation of results moni-
tored in that light. Institutions can facilitate and create a normal pattern
of acceptable conduct. They can limit the number and degree of but
cannot avert deviations. The processual goal is to identify and enjoin
(socially, politically and legally) promptly and effectively by grievance
raising, conciliation and injunctive relief procedures with power to provide
prompt, equitable and effective resolutions of real or potential conflict
accessible to poor people and their organizations as well as to weak
minority peoples and communities.
There will be violations of human rights and debasement of the human
condition. Need, honest error and greed combine to ensure that. To create
incentives to avert their multiplying and to make public the challenges
and threats to human rights/human dimension there must be laws, legal
processes and accessible procedures to sanction these offenses. Compen-
sation for damage done is sometimes an equally important component of
effective redress, as is the imposition of criminal, as well as civil, penalties
on gross offenders.
There is a need to pay attention to causation. Need-based offenses do
not - with very rare exceptions - justify criminal sanctions. Hanging
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every peasant who cuts down trees or bushes for fuel or house poles in
ecologically at risk areas is neither an equitable nor a conceivably effective
way of halting erosion, desertification (strictly speaking neo-desertification)
or deforestation. (Indeed the wood requirement of gallows would be so
great as to have the reverse effect.) Empowerment (in this case by
silviculture education plus relevant seedlings, by state or community
reforestation and erosion control, by alternative fuel provision and/or by
selective, voluntary, assisted resettlement) is a precondition for halting
need-based erosion of the human condition. When empowerment is in
process, civil regulations are needed as is their enforcement. Fining those
who chop down genuinely community planted and tended trees is hardly
unreasonable and may be essential. Honest error should not be confused
with greed or malice. Honest error after careful study and evaluation of
options in a participatory, accountable context should rarely be sanctioned
at all. To do so is to create an incentive never to decide but always to
postpone or refer. What needs to be sanctioned is negligence.
Severe sanctions should apply to violations related to greed - for
power, for non-accountability, or for material gain. The first goal is to
stop the offense and the broader to avert (or at least reduce) its repetition.
If major damage has been done, securing redress is important - from
the offender if possible, otherwise from more or less innocent parties -
in practice likely to be taxpayers or users of other public services if the
state reimburses - more able to bear the cost than the initial victims.
But limiting future damages to future victims is always central. Exposure
to public opinion of a high profile sanctioning process is costly and the
real risk of sanctions are perceived as good economic reason to allocate
resources to avoid being sanctionable. The process matters by itself in
addition to the impact of its outcome. Union Carbide has been shaken
(almost to pieces) by the Bhopal case and other chemical companies
appear to have decided that, at least to some extent, prevention and safety
pay.
Sanctioning institutions and structures matters. The law's delay is
proverbial. Thought (and action on it) as to what civil and criminal
remedies are needed for human rights violations/human condition de-
basement is needed. The issues are complex - criminal law processes
often do not cover redress to victims; in civil cases procedures other than
standard gladiatorial court contests may offer effective redress faster. But
access is crucial no matter how appropriate the institutions and procedures.
Access to specialist personnel and to financing the costs of the process.
Poor people do not and in any practicable and equitable legal system
cannot, argue, finance, win major court cases by themselves. They need
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specialists to support them and money to pay them, both of which are
often unavailable in Africa.
XVIII. Pluralism - Potential Relevance
The role of pluralism is to increase the probability that persons -
especially poor persons - will be able to organize themselves to act, to
influence the actions of others and to hold other major actors to account.
At the national, provincial and basic community level three clusters of
issues or topics appear to be central: a) civil society and its room to
organize and to act, b) accountability and, c) access to channels designed
to protect empowerment.
Civil society is used here as a shorthand for freedom of self organi-
zation, self expression and self operated action initiatives especially, but
not only, at base level. It need not mean pluralism in the North American
sense and is no more inconsistent (or at any rate antagonistically contra-
dictory) with decentralized, democratic single mass party systems than
with bourgeois democratic structures.
The necessity of room for manoeuvre for civil society rests on two
legs: first, people in base communities or action groups have knowledge
of their own needs and potentials no one else does or can have, and
second, unless poor people and marginalized groups are able to participate
- in production, in mobilization, in decision-taking and in calling deci-
sion-takers (including their own leadership) to account, there will be no
objective and especially no institutional power base to protect their inter-
ests from counter-attacks by other interest groups who are organized.
Room for manoeuvre requires self-organization and control over or-
ganizations. Some aspects require immediacy and operational autonomy.
Even with local level freedom of action within nationally integrated single
channel structures, it is doubtful whether this can be achieved or sustained
and reasonably certain that it can be achieved more easily and sustained
more securely with multiple organizational structures. The cases for spe-
cialization and division of labor and for competition are not inherently
capitalist. Comrade Gorbachev seems to agree - albeit his case for quasi-
pluralism is purely functional and within a control frame arguably too
rigid for the sought quasi-pluralism to have adequate vitality and impact
or even much staying power. The evident cases are religious and cultural
organizations. Almost equally strong ones can be made out for economic
interest (or sub-class) based organizations, for informational channels and
for gender and age based groups. It is simply untrue that all local level
organizations or actions need to be consolidated into provincial and
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national structures so long as coordination and mechanisms to correct
damaging inconsistencies exist.
Accountability faces two very real problems. Multiple channels and
organizations do not guarantee internal accountability of any. Lack of
accountability in SSA is frequently pervasive, not limited to central
political institutions. There appears to be a correlation between political
channel non-accountability and non-accountability of other organizations.
This should not be cause for despair but it is cause for further reflection
as to the conditions and contexts appropriate/conducive to achieving and
sustaining accountability in various types of organizations, especially ones
large and complex enough that direct, face to face accountability is
impracticable.
Accountability takes time. It need not slow down action so much as
to be dysfunctional. But while most members want accountability to be
available, so long as leaders and officials deliver what are broadly viewed
as acceptable results, only a small minority of members are willing to
devote much time to enforcing and operating accountability. Unless an
ongoing base level of accountability praxis exists it is wishful thinking
that it can suddenly be turned on when things go wrong.
Protecting empowerment - especially of poor persons and groups
(sub-classes) which are predominately poor or vulnerable - is central to
a "human condition"' 'right to development" oriented strategy and praxis.
The impact of pluralism is, unfortunately, distinctly problematic. This is
not inherent in pluralism but a probable result of partial pluralism in
societies in which resource distribution (including time, knowledge and
influence on/power over central political institutions) is radically unequally
distributed. Trade unions are historically most effective at organizing
employees with above average skills and wages. Their interests are unlikely
to be identical to those of workers with lower skills and wages and a
fortiori to those unemployed. In SSA non-wage predominantly labor
incomes - i.e. peasants, other household producers, small scale enterprise
operators - are central to more households than are middle and large
employer wage payments. Their interests are in some areas analogous with
those of trade unions but in others they really are competitive. The answer
does not lie in suppressing or co-opting trade unions but in building up
equally strong organizations in other labor income sub-sectors. Until that
is achieved the view that trade union strength and freedom of manoeuvre
may not serve the interests of the majority of poor households is by no
means necessarily disingenuous.
XIX. Constitutions, Constitutional Orders and Pluralism
In SSA the average gap between constitutional orders defined as basic
political/civil society goals and operating principles and constitutional
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documents (constitutions) is exceptionally wide. Constitutions do not
comprehend important parts of the constitutional order. Substantial gaps
between constitutional (in either order or document sense) goals and
practices exist and formal documents tend to lag behind praxis.
The argument that constitutions are used to mystify and to manipulate
by dominant decision taking coalitions (often quite narrow ones) which
have very different goals and preferred operating principles may well miss
the bottom line. Many African constitutions are simply irrelevant. They
do not in any meaningful sense represent the goals or operating principles
of any significant interest groups/sub-classes, are not seen as relevant to
constitutional orders and exist because it is believed that, like national
anthems, coats of arms and flags, constitutions and "development plans"
are something that states have to have for ceremonial and formal symbolic
purposes.
The reasons for this situation are by no means obscure. Pre-colonial
Sub-Saharan African polities rarely had written and often did not have
formally codified oral constitutions. (The exceptions to the first rule were
almost without exception both transitory and cases of pre-colonial neo-
colonialism, e.g. the Fanti Confederacy and the Rehoboth Kaptaincy.)
They had constitutional orders and frequently evolving, disintegrating or
structurally changing ones, but formal constitutions of the Western type
played negligible roles in them. In many cases the colonial states also
literally did not have constitutions and where in some sense they did these
were primarily pieces of administrative and organizational law. It cannot
be asserted that the constitutional orders of the metropolitan states were
the actual constitutions of the colonial states - very much au contraire.
The first round of independence constitutions, with few exceptions,
were formed and imposed by the departing colonial state with limited
input from the emergent domestic constitutional order. This did less than
nothing either for their contextual appropriateness of for commitment to
them or to constitutions more generally as documents of real significance.
Exceptions include Ethiopia, but in that case the Imperial Constitutions
were luxury consumer goods import rather like the western liberal/phi-
losophy elements used as Christmas tree ornaments on the Tsarist state
by Peter and Katherine the Great. Two other exceptions are Angola and
Mozambique where revolutionary movements drafted and enacted them.
While idealistic (in the technical sense of that term) despite their Marxist-
Leninist form, they were seen as more serious documents and might have
been so had both states not been engulfed by wars of resistance to external
aggression. Arguably Mozambique has had an evolution of its constitu-
tional order at least in part organically linked to constitution evolution.
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Subsequent constitutions have rarely emerged from genuine reflective
and participatory processes. This is fairly evident in the case of the
products of coups and of elite revolutions but is of broader relevance.
The post military government Ghanaian and Njgerian constitutions were
in certain senses focused so heavily on avertrinA repetition of particular
routes to breakdowns which had led to military takeovers as to be only
formalistically concerned with many basic goals, non-operable and re-
markably open to new abuses and disintegrative tendencies.
This generalization does have exceptions. The post-independence Tan-
zanian constitutional reshapings (including the party constitutions) do arise
out of the evolution of the constitutional order. Whatever their limitations,
they are serious, related to reality and have a participatory and political
power base grounding. The post Lancaster House Zimbabwean constitu-
tional amendments (here perhaps especially the ZANU-ZAPU merger
modifications to the surviving ZANU constitution) may well represent the
start of a similar process.
XX. Constitutional Orders - And Their Imperfections
African states have constitutional orders. In respect to breadth of base
(or more accurately narrowness), predictability of decisions, stability of
procedures and scope or reach of the constitutional order, many are
objectively weak and/or eroding. Some are disintegrating or excessively
hard to define as other than pathological except in terms of a narrow
group of beneficiaries, e.g. authoritarian kleptocracies in which the pur-
pose of public office (however acquired) is private gain and the chief
means of securing political (or military) support is fairly literally buying
it. The most frequently cited cases are Zaire, Sierra Leone and Liberia
but despite its origins and initial ddmocratic patina the actual nature of
the last Nigerian civil state tended in that direction and Amin's Uganda
was an example whose short life related to over-use of violence, under-
use of coherent tactics and failure to maintain workable relations with
external patrons/protectors.
Self-serving decision-taking coalition-defined and enforced constitu-
tional orders are common in Africa - and globally. The degree of
narrowness and the particular makeup of the sub-class coalitions vary but
the basic natures seem similar. Kenya, the C8te d'Ivoire and Guinea-
Bissau and Burkina (today) are examples. Regimes - usually but not
always authoritarian - without very clear, broad or stable sub-class
coalition bases are not uncommon, e.g. Ghana (1982 to date), Burkina
(of Sankara), Uganda today and in a very different way Malawi (at least
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until 1986). Fragility and possibility of sharp change (from within the
regime as well as by its mutation or demise) may be the only common
features of such systems; certainly the substantive constitutional order
goals of J.J. Rawlings and Hastings Banda have little in common.
A final category of limited, potentially pathological or pathological
constitutional orders (in this case limited but in danger of more dire
futures) is those which have had greater breadth, participation and scope
but are disintegrating under external or domestic tension at or near the
level of organized, large scale violence and/or disintegration of the re-
source base actually mobilizable by the state and its most important sub-
class supporters. Post Nimeiri Sudan illustrated and post 1975 Zambia
illustrates this pattern.
But healthier, more broadly based and arguably evolving/developing
constitutional orders also exist. Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania and
Botswana are all examples and a case can be made for including somewhat
problematic cases like Senegal and Gambia.
Starting from a human condition/right to development approach the
features of assent, participation, access, equity and operability needed to
develop constitutional orders can be fairly readily articulated. However,
because the starting points diverge massively (Sierra Leone is not Tanzania;
Cape Verde is not Equatorial Guinea; Sudan is not Mozambique; Uganda
is not Kenya) as do the present dominant decision taking coalitions, the
concrete possibilities for, requirements of and constraints on short term
mobilization and action vary widely. Except in a handful of cases,
constitutional order reconstruction and development is a precondition for
constitution reform to be effective. Seeking once again to substitute a
legal engineering superstructure for a constitutional order infrastructure
is no more likely to be productive now than over 1957-1988. Pluralism
can play a role in building up the breadth and strength of the constitutional
order. However, to do so many parallel channel and other independent
organizations in SSA need to look first at their own constitutional orders.
These are often just as weak, disintegrating or pathological as those of
states.
XXI. Envol
Neo-liberalism and growthmanship both face rapidly waning credibility
and legitimacy in SSA. Right to development/human condition strategic
and tactical approaches - the latter exemplified by the Khartoum Dec-
laration - have gained substantial intellectual, policy maker and opera-
tional credibility and support. The roles of participation, self-organization,
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decentralization and accountability in these approaches interact with par-
ticipatory pluralism.
Where now is a question subject to intellectual examination, but from
the point of view of those - predominantly Africans in SSA - whose
well-being and in many cases literal survival depends on reversal of 1980s
trends, the challenge is that of the Mara proverb cited by Mwalimu
Nyerere:
Rabbit, where are you?
I am going to kill the Elephant!
Can you really do it?
Well, I'll try and try again!
REFERENCES
C. Allison & R.H. Green (eds.), Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa: What agendas for action?, 14 (1) IDS BULL. January 1983.
-, & R.H. Green (eds.), Sub-Saharan Africa: Getting the Facts Straight,
16 (3) IDS BULL. July 1985.
_, Health and Education for Development: African Women's Status
and Prospects, in CRISIS AND RECOVERY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (T.
Rose ed. 1985).
B. BALASSA & F.D. MCCARTHY, ADJUSTMENT POLICIES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, 1979-83, AN UPDATE (World Bank Staff Working Papers
No. 675, 1984).
BANK OF TANzANIA, TANZANIA TWENTY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE (1961-
1981): A REVIEW OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1984).
R. CHAMBERS, RURAL DEVELOPMENT - PUTTING THE LAST FIRST (1983).
__, NORMAL PROFESSIONALISM, NEW PARADIGMS AND DEVELOPMENT (IDS
Discussion Paper No. 227, 1986).
C.L. Colclough & R.H. Green (eds.), Stabilization - For Growth or
Decay? Short Run Costs and Long Run Uncertainties in Africa, 19
(1) IDS BULL. January 1988.
K.M. Cleaver, THE IMPACT OF PRICE AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES ON
AGRICULTURE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (World Bank Staff Working
Papers No. 728, 1985).
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, TOWARD A NEW BRETTON WOODS: CHAL-
LENGES FOR THE WORLD FINANCIAL AND TRADING SYSTEMS (1983).
__, THE DEBT CRISIS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (1984).
G.A. Cornia, R. Jolly, & F. Stewart (eds.), ADJUSTMENT WITH A HUMAN
FACE: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE AND PROMOTING GROWTH (1987).
PARTICIPATORY PLURALISM AND PERVASIVE POVERTY 51
P. Daniel, R.H. Green & M. Lipton, A Strategy for the Rural Poor, in
SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA: TOWARDS OBLIVION OR RECONSTRUCTION (Jour-
nal of Development Planning No. 15, 1985).
R. Davies & D. Saunders, Stabilization Policies and the Effects on Child
Health in Zimbabwe, 38 REV. AR. POL. ECON. 1987.
S.S. Dell, ON BEING GRANDMOTHERLY: THE EVOLUTION OF IMF CONDI-
TIONALITY (Princeton University Essays in International Finance, 1981).
-, & R. Lawrence, THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROCESS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (1980).
-, Balance-of-Payment Adjustment in the 1980s, 14 (8) WORLD DEV.
(Special issue 1987).
K. Dervis, J. de Melo & S. Robinson, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS FOR
DEVELOPMENT POLICY (1982).
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA (UN ECA), ECA AND AFRICA'S DE-
VELOPMENT, 1983-1008, A PRELIMINARY PERSPECTIVE STUDY (Addis
Ababa, 1983).
-, SURVEY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN AFRICA 1985-1986
(Addis Ababa, 1986).
-, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 1986
(Addis Ababa, 1986).
-THE KHARTOUM DECLARATION: TOWARDS A HUMAN-FOCUSED AP-
PROACH To SoCIo-ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA,
The International Conference on the Human Dimension of Africa's
Economic Recovery and Development, Economic Commission for
Africa (Khartoum, March 1988).
M. Godfrey, Trade and exchange rate policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, in
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: GETTING THE FACTS STRAIGHT (C. Allison &
R.H. Green (eds.), 16 (3), IDS BULL. July 1985.
R.H. Green, Political-Economic Adjustment and IMF Conditionality, in
IMF CONDITIONALITY (J. Williamson ed. 1983).
-_, "IMF Conditionality" (review article) in THIRD WORLD REV., 1984.
__, From Deepening Economic Malaise Toward Renewed Development:
Notes Toward African Agendas For Action, 15 J.DEv. PLAN. (1985).
-, IMF stabilization and structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa:
are they technically compatible? in SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: GETTING
THE FACTS STRAIGHT (C. Allison & R.H. Green eds.), 16 (3) IDS BULL,
July 1985.
-, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: POVERTY OF DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT OF
POVERTY (IDS Discussion Paper No. 218, July 1986).
-, THE IMF AND STABILIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A CRITICAL
REVIEW (IDS Discussion Paper No. 216, June 1986).
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1989
-, Food Policy, Food Production and Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Retrospect and Prospect, 41 (4) INT'L J. (1986).
-, Hunger, Poverty and Food Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa: Retrospect
& Potential, 10 (4) DISASTERS (1986).
-, Budget Management as Economic Management: Some Key Concerns,
in Ndegwa, Mureithi and Green, 1987.
-, Managing Economic Regionalism: Towards a New Approach, in
Ndegwa, Mureithi and Green, 1987.
, KILLING THE DREAM: THE POLITICAL AND HUMAN ECONOMY OF WAR
IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA (IDS Discussion Paper No. 238, November
1987).
-, HUNGER, POVERTY AND FOOD AID IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA, World
Food Programme/African Development Bank Seminar on Food Aid
for Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 8-11 September 1986 (World
Food Programme Occasional Papers, 21 July 1987).
-, The Human Dimension As The Test Of And A Means Of Achieving
Africa's Economic Recovery and Development, Reweaving the Social
Fabric, Restoring the Broken Pot, paper for the UN ECA International
Conference on the Human Dimension of Africa's Economic Recovery
and Development, Khartoum, Sudan, 5-8 March 1988, ECA/ICHD/
88/3 and Executive Summary ECA/ICHD/88/3/Add. 1.
-, D. Asrat, M. Mauras & R. Morgan, Children in Southern Africa,
in UNICEF, CHILDREN ON THE FRONT LINE: THE IMPACT OF APART-
HEID, DESTABILISATION AND WARFARE ON CHILDREN IN SOUTHERN AND
SOUTH AFRICA (1987).
-, D. Rwegasira & B. Van Arkadie, ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND NATIONAL
POLICY MAKING: TANZANIA IN THE 1970s (1981).
-, & H.W. Singer, Sub-Saharan Africa in Depression: The Impact of
The Welfare of Children, in Jolly and Cornia, 1984.
S. Griffith-Jones & R.H. Green, AFRICAN EXTERNAL DEBT AND DEVEL-
OPMENT: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS (UNCTAD Technical Assistance
Study for African Center for Monetary Studies, Dakar, 1984).
-, External Debt: Sub-Saharan Africa's Emerging Iceberg in CRISIS AND
RECOVERY IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA (T. Rose ed., OECD Development
Center, 1985).
-, & C. Harvey, WORLD PRICES AND DEVELOPMENT (1985).
GROUP OF 24, Low INCOME COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
SYSTEM REPORT OF A GROUP OF EXPERTS (1982).
C. Harvey, Successful adjustment in Botswana in SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
GETTING THE FACTS STRAIGHT (C. Allison & R.H. Green eds.) 16 (3)
IDS BULL. July 1985.
PARTICIPATORY PLURALISM AND PERVASIVE POVERTY 53
G.K. Helleiner, Lender of Early Resort: The IMF and the Poorest, 73
(2) AM. ECON. REv. (1983).
-, THE IMF AND AFRICA IN THE 1980's (Princeton Essays in Interna-
tional Finance No. 152, 1983).
-, An Agenda for a New Bretton Woods, WORLD POL'Y J. (1984).
-, Aid and Liquidity: The Neglect of SSA and Others of the Poorest
in the Emerging International Monetary System, 15 J. DEV. PLAN.
(1985).
-, The Question of Conditionality in Sub-Saharan Africa in AFRIcAN
DEBT AND FINANcINo (J. Williamson ed. 1986).
P.S. Heller & J.E. Aghveli, The Recurrent Cost Problem: An International
Overview in Howell (ed.), 1984.
J. Howell (ed.), RECURRENT COSTS AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
(1984).
P. Hugon, The Impact of Adjustment Policy in Madagascar, in Colclough
& Green, 1988.
J. Iliffe, THE AFRICAN POOR (African Studies Series 58, 1987).
IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (1983, 1984, 1985, 1986).
SURVEY (September 1984).
-, Formulation of Exchange Rate Policies in Adjustment Programs,
(Occasional Paper No. 36, August 1985).
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, EMPLOYMENT, GROWTH AND BASIC
NEEDS: A ONE WORLD PROBLEM (1975).
-, STABILIZATION, ADJUSTMENT AND POVERTY (World Employment Pro-
gramme Working Papers No.1, Geneva, 1986).
E.V.K. Jaycox, R.I. Gulhati, S. Lall & S. Yalamanchili, The Nature of
the Debt Problem in Eastern and Southern Africa, in Lancaster and
Williamson, 1986.
O.E.G. Johnson, THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND ADJUSTMENT PRO-
GRAMMES SUPPORTED BY IMF STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS (Overseas
Development Institute Conference Paper, London, September 1987).
A.R. Jolly & G.A. Cornia, The Impact of World Recession On Children,
12 (3) WORLD DEv. (Special issue 1984)
X. Kadhani & R.H. Green, Parameters as warnings and guide posts: the
case of Zimbabwe, J. DEV. PLAN. (1985).
M. Khan, Macroeconomic Adjustment In Developing Countries: A Policy
Perspective, 1 (2) WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER (January 1984).
-, & M. Knight, STABILIZATION PROGRAMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(IMF Staff Papers, 28 March 1981).
M. Kibaki, Managing Development: Human and Political Imperatives, in
Ndegwa, Mureithi and Green, 1987.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1989
T. Killick, Unsettled Questions About Adjustment with Growth, INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL ISSUES FOR THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (UNCTAD, 1987).
-, THE IMF AND STABILIZATION: DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCE
(1984).
_, The IMF's Role in Developing Countries, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
(September 1984).
C. Lancaster & J. Williamson (eds.), AFRICAN DEBT AND FINANCING
(1986).
J. DE LAROISiERE, DOES THE FUND IMPOSE AUSTERITY? (1984).
M. Lipton, Research and the Design of a Policy Frame for Agriculture,
in CRISIS AND RECOVERY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (T. Rose ed. 1985).
_, THE PLACE OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA, (IDS Discussion Paper No. 202, 1985).
__, IMPROVING THE IMPACT OF Am FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT, (IDS
Discussion Paper, 1987).
R. Longhurst, Structural Adjustment And Vulnerable Groups in Sierra
Leone in Colclough and Green, 1988.
J. Loxley, The IMF and the Poorest Countries, the Performance of the
Least Developed Countries Under IMF Stand-by Arrangements (1984).
-, IMF and World Bank Conditionality and Sub-Saharan Africa (Af-
rican Studies Association [USA] Annual Conference [Microfiche],
1984).
D. Martin & P. Johnson (eds.), DESTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT, SOUTHERN
AFRICA AT WAR (Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986).
P. Ndegwa, Co-operation Among Sub-Saharan African Countries: An
Engine of Growth?, 15 J. DEV. PLAN. (1985).
-, L.P. Mureithi & R.H. Green (eds.), MANAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT:
PRIORITY THEMES IN AFRICA TODAY (1987).
__, DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS FOR AFRICA IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND (1985).
B. Onimode (ed.), THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THE AFRICAN DEBT:
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Institute For African Alter-
natives/ZED Books, 1989).
OAU, AFRICA'S PRIORITY PROGRAMME FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY, 1986-
1990 (FAO for OAU, Addis Ababa, 1985).
__/ECA, AFRICA'S SUBMISSION To THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON AFRICA'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
CRISIS (Addis Ababa, 1986).
I.G. Patel, The Current Crisis in International Economic Cooperation, 14
J. DEV. PLAN. (1984).
PARTICIPATORY PLURALISM AND PERVASIVE POVERTY 55
S. Please, Structural Adjustment, IMF Conditionality, And The World
Bank," in THE HOBBLED GLANT: ESSAYS ON THE WORLD BANK (1984).
J.J. Polak, MONETARY ANALYSIS OF INCOME FORIATION AND PAYMENTS
PROBLEMS (IMF Staff Papers, June 1957).
P. Robson, Performance and Priorities for Regional Integration with
Special Reference to West Africa, in CRISIS AND RECOVERY IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA (T. Rose ed. 1985).
T. ROSE (ed.), CRISIS AND RECOVERY IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA (OCED
Development Center, 1985).
S. Rossen, Aspects of Economic Integration Policies in Africa, with Special
Reference to the Southern African Development Coordination Con-
ference, in CRISIS AND RECOVERY IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA (T.Rose
ed., 1985).
C. Stoneman (ed.), ZIMBWE'S PROSPECTS: ISSUES OF RACE, CLASS AND
STATE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1988).
J. Topolski, Togo: A Structural Adjustment That Destabilizes Economic
Growth, in Colclough and Green, 1988.
UNICEF, WITHIN HUMAN REACH: A FUTURE FOR AFRICA'S CHILDREN
(1985).
-, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN (1986, 1987).
W. Weekes-Vagliani, Women, Food and Rural Development, in Rose,
1985.
D. Wheeler, Sources of Stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa, 12 (1) WORLD
DEV. (1984).
K. Williamson, IMF CONDITIONALrrY (Institute For International Econom-
ics, 1983).
-, Prospects for the Flow of IMF Finance to Sub-Saharan Africa in
AFRICAN DEBT AND FINANCING (C. Lancaster & J. Williamson eds.,
Institute for International Economics, 1986).
WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN
AGENDA FOR ACTION (1981).
__, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: PROGRESS REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT PROS-
PECTS AND PROGRAMS (1983).
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1983-1987).
TOWARD SUSTAINED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A JOINT
PROGRAMME OF ACTION (1984).
-, FINANCING ADJUSTMENT WITH GROWTH IN SuB-SAHARAN AFRICA,
1986-90 (1986).
56 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1989
WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES/CHURCHES COMMISSION ON PARTICIPATION
IN DEVELOPMENT, LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT: AN Ec-
UMENiCAL REAPPRAISAL (Report of Advisory Group on Economic
Matters, Moderator, J. Pronk; Rapporteur, R.H. Green, 1987).
-, WORLD HUNGER: A CmUSTIAN REAPPRAISAL (AGEM Report edited
by C. Espiritu, D. de Gaspar, R.H. Green, 1982).
